Need for (the right) speed : the timing and composition of public debt deleveraging by ROMEI, Federica
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author Author and Author Author  
MWP 2015/11 
Max Weber Programme 
 
Need for (the Right) Speed: the Timing and 
Composition of Public Debt Deleveraging 
 
Federica Romei  
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
European University Institute 
Max Weber Programme 
 
Need for (the Right) Speed: the Timing and Composition of 
Public Debt Deleveraging 
 
Federica Romei 
 
EUI Working Paper MWP 2015/11 
 
  
 
 
 
 
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for 
other purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). 
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. 
 
 
ISSN 1830-7728 
 
© Federica Romei,  2015 
Printed in Italy 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
Abstract 
This paper studies the optimal path for public debt deleveraging in a heterogeneous agents framework 
under incomplete financial markets. My analysis addresses two questions. What is the optimal fiscal 
instrument the government needs to use to reduce public debt? What is the optimal speed of public 
debt deleveraging? The main finding is that public debt should be reduced quickly and by cutting 
public expenditure. If the fiscal authority is forced to use income taxation instead, public debt 
deleveraging needs to be slow. Independently of fiscal instruments, the economy may end up in a 
liquidity trap. I show that, in my model, the zero lower bound has a redistributive effect. If the 
liquidity trap is very persistent, it can reallocate resources from financially constrained agents to 
financially unconstrained ones. Due to this mechanism, a very slow public debt reduction achieved by 
increasing income taxation is very costly in terms of aggregate welfare. 
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1 Introduction
After the recent financial crisis, the United States has experienced an un-
precedented rise in the size of its public debt, as shown in Figure 1.1 From
a policy perspective, there are important concerns regarding a pressing need
for the United States to reduce its stock of public liabilities. Indeed, re-
cent experience in the European Union has highlighted the risks associated
with large liability positions for the public sector, especially when sources of
funding are abruptly reduced.
Moreover, a second fact has characterized recent developments in the US
economy. Wealth inequality has risen almost constantly in the last twenty
years and it is now at one of the highest levels ever experienced in the last
century. For example, the concentration of wealth of the top 10% and 1%
agents rose from 1970 until 2010, both in the U.S. and in Europe, as shown
in Figure 1, second panel. Policymakers in the United States and abroad
have recently highlighted the concerns posed by rising income and wealth
inequality.2
This paper studies the optimal way to implement austerity measures, in
a context of heterogeneous agents in the spirit of Bewley (1977) and Aiyagari
(1994). My analysis addresses two main questions: What is the optimal fiscal
instrument the government needs to use to reduce public debt? What is the
optimal speed of public debt deleveraging?
In my model, agents are heterogeneous along two dimensions. First, they
differ in terms of employment status: they can be workers, either employed
or unemployed, or they can be entrepreneurs. Second, they can endogenously
accumulate assets, thus making agents heterogeneous in terms of wealth.The
presence of heterogeneity with respect to employment status allows me to
match some key features of the wealth distribution in the United States.
The stock of public debt can be reduced by the fiscal authority either by
increasing revenue through distortionary income taxation or by reducing the
flow of public expenditure. Public expenditure provides utility services to
the agents, and it is an imperfect substitute for private consumption.3
A key result of my study, robust to different specifications, is that the
1This figure shows the public debt to GDP dynamic for the U.S. and for the European
Union with 26 countries from 1996 to 2014.
2See, e.g., Yellen (2014).
3The case of welfare-increasing public expenditure, which is an imperfect complement
to private consumption, is analyzed in the appendix.
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Figure 1: Motivating Evidence
Data for public debt are taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis and
from the European Commission AMECO. Data on wealth distribution are taken
from Piketty (2014).
optimal policy is to reduce public debt quickly, by cutting public expenditure.
Behind this result, an important role is played by the dynamics of the real
interest rate. By reducing public expenditure, the fiscal authority induces a
demand shock to the economy. As a consequence, the real interest rate tends
to be low precisely when the debt reduction is taking place. This phenomenon
helps the government to achieve the public deleveraging, thus avoiding the
need for larger cuts in public spending. Moreover, when the debt reduction
takes place, the burden of interest payments faced by borrowers is reduced.
It is important for public debt deleveraging to be fast, so as to have low real
interest rates when debt is at its highest. Under this policy, however, some
agents lose in terms of welfare. These are the wealthiest, who experience,
due to the fall in the interest rate, a decrease in the value of their assets.
If the fiscal authority is constrained to use income taxation, public debt
must be reduced slowly. By increasing taxation, the fiscal authority now
creates a negative supply shock. Unlike the case of public expenditure, real
interest rates are high when the bulk of public deleveraging occurs. Most
agents want the real interest rate to be at its highest when debt is at its lowest,
namely in the last quarter of deleveraging. This is only compatible with a
3
slow debt reduction. However, agents do not postpone the debt deleveraging
to an extreme degree, since they dislike fluctuations in tax rates. Again,
under this policy, the wealthiest agents are the ones who lose the most in
term of welfare.
Independently of the fiscal instrument used to achieve the public debt
reduction, the economy may fall into a liquidity trap. The zero lower bound
has, in the context of my model, a novel effect due to the presence of het-
erogeneous agents. This is in addition to traditional aggregate effects that
have been studied in detail in the literature. At the aggregate level, when
the zero lower bound binds, the economy faces lower output and an infla-
tion rate below the central bank’s target.4 Moreover, the zero lower bound
also has a redistributive effect. When the economy enters a liquidity trap,
firms cut their labor demand, depressing real wages. This is due to the con-
temporaneous presence of nominal rigidities and inflation below the target
of the central bank. Therefore, the labor income share falls and the profit
share rises, meaning that income will be reallocated from the employed to the
entrepreneurs. In my model, the financially-constrained agents are mostly
among the employed, while entrepreneurs are, in general, financially uncon-
strained. Hence, the zero lower bound redistributes resources from agents
whose marginal propensity to consume is high to the ones whose marginal
propensity is low. This, in turn, exacerbates the output recession and en-
hances the welfare costs of the liquidity trap, thus affecting preferences re-
garding policy. In particular, this occurs when the fiscal authority reduces
public debt slowly by increasing income taxation. Under this circumstance,
the agents, aware of the future output recession, want to smooth consump-
tion. Current savings increase, depressing current real interest rates and
making the zero lower bound bind. As a consequence, these combinations
become the costliest for the economy in terms of welfare. A policy implica-
tion is that the fiscal authority needs to avoid an excessive postponement of
debt reduction when this is achieved by income taxation.
My research is closely related to two different strands of the literature:
one that has focused on private debt deleveraging and its interaction with
monetary policy, and another one on optimal fiscal policy under commitment.
Papers in the literature on private debt deleveraging typically model the event
as an exogenous shock and then analyze the impact of different monetary
4For a discussion of this mechanism, see Adam and Billi (2006, 2007), Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003, 2004) and Werning (2011).
4
policies in that context. Some recent papers, such as Guerrieri and Lorenzoni
(2010), Krugman and Eggertsson (2012), Philippon and Midrigan (2011) and
Benigno and Eggertsson and Romei (2014) have studied debt deleveraging in
a closed economy. Others, among which Fornaro (2012), Cook and Devereux
(2012) and Benigno and Romei (2012), have focused on the consequences
of private debt deleveraging in an international context. I depart from this
literature in two important ways: First, I concentrate my analysis on a public
debt deleveraging episode. Second, while this literature has focused on a
particular deleveraging path, I instead analyze how different debt reduction
paths can affect agents welfare.
Second, my paper is also related to the literature on optimal fiscal policy.
In their seminal paper, Lucas and Stokey (1983) show how the public au-
thority should react to a shock when it is possible to issue state contingent
debt, in a representative-consumer framework. Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent
and Seppala (2002) analyze the same problem when the public authority
cannot issue state contingent debt. More recently, many authors have pro-
ceeded to study how optimal fiscal policy changes once the representative
agent assumption is departed from, such as Werning (2007) and Bandhari,
Evans, Golosov and Sargent (2013) among others. This literature aims to
understand how a government can optimally react to a shock. My paper,
instead, aims to understand the nature of the optimal government-induced
shock in the economy.
Finally, my research is close to the work of Aiyagari and McGrattan
(1997) and Ro¨hrs and Winter (2014). Both papers study the optimal level
of public debt in a model with heterogeneous agents where financial markets
are incomplete. In particular, the novel contribution of Ro¨hrs and Winter
to the existing literature consists in an analysis of the consequences on ag-
gregate welfare of a public debt reduction achieved by changes in income
taxation. In reference to this literature, my contribution is to study the opti-
mal composition and speed of fiscal consolidations, with particular focus on
how these affect the distribution of wealth and welfare across agents. More-
over, I also focus on economies with relevant price frictions, in which the
zero-lower bound can be an important constraint on the adjustment process.
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2 Model
I consider a discrete-time closed-economy model inhabited by a continuum of
consumers on a unit interval, interacting with final and intermediate good-
producing firms, a fiscal authority, a social security scheme and a central
bank. The consumers are subject to idiosyncratic uncertainty, but they have
perfect foresight about the path of aggregate variables. The economy is not
subject to aggregate uncertainty. Asset markets are incomplete in the spirit
of Bewley (1977). I start by analyzing the steady state of the model. The
next section studies the transition of the economy after the fiscal authority is
forced to reduce the level of public debt. The following subsections describe
the problem solved by each type of agent in detail.
2.1 Consumers
The consumers differ in terms of employment status and wealth. In each pe-
riod an agent may be either unemployed, employed or an entrepreneur. The
employment status of the agents evolves according to an exogenous Markov
process. I denote this with the index s, which can take values in the set
{U,L,E} for unemployed, employed and entrepreneur, respectively. I di-
vide the unit interval in three subsets, {U ,L, E}, the first referring to unem-
ployed, the second to employed and the third to entrepreneurs respectively.
The ergodic distribution of the Markov process implies a constant mass U˜
of unemployed agents, L˜ of employed agents and a mass E˜ of entrepreneurs.
The agents’ wealth evolves endogenously according to their borrowing and
saving decisions. This, in turn, is determined by their individual state vari-
ables, employment status and wealth, as well as by the path of the aggregate
variables .
All agents have identical preferences over streams of consumption, c, gov-
ernment expenditure, G, and leisure. Employed agents can choose the num-
bers of hours, l, to supply to firms. Unemployed agents and entrepreneurs
do not supply labor and they enjoy their whole endowment of leisure.5 The
expected lifetime utility of each individual agent i can be expressed as:
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt (u(cit, Gt)− ν(li,t))
]
(1)
5I assume that if an agent does not work l = 0.
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where E[.] is the mathematical expectation operator, β is the subjective
discount factor and u(.) is a concave, twice-differentiable function satisfy-
ing Inada conditions. The function ν(.) is convex and twice differentiable.
Without loss of generality, I assume that ν(0) = 0. The expectation operator
E0[.] in equation (1) refers to the idiosyncratic uncertainty faced by agent i
at time 0 regarding his future employment status.
Income differs across agents and it is endogenous. All the unemployed
agents receive an unemployment benefit σt in each period. The employed
agents receive an hourly real wage, wt. They pay a lump sum social security
contribution ρt that is time-varying. They also pay a proportional tax on
their labor income, τt which accrues to the fiscal authority. The entrepreneurs
receive profit from the firms, $t, and they pay the same tax rate τt on their
income as the employed agents.
The agents, independently of their type, trade one-period riskless bonds,
bi,t+1, denominated in units of consumption goods, paying a real interest rate,
rt. They enter each period with a predetermined stock of debt, bi,t. Negative
values for b represent positive wealth. The individual budget constraint is as
follows:
ci,t =
bi,t+1
1 + rt
−bi,t+IUi σt+ILi (wtli,t(1− τt)− ρt)+(1−IUi −ILi )$t(1−τt) (2)
where IUi is an indicator function equal to one if the agent is unemployed
and ILi is an indicator function equal to one if the agent is employed. I
assume that
ρt = %wt
∫
i∈L
li,tdi
where % is a parameter governing the fraction of average labor income accru-
ing to the unemployed, namely the gross replacement rate. As a consequence,
each worker’s contribution is independent of their individual labor income but
it does depend on the aggregate labor income. Finally, all the agents face an
exogenous borrowing constraint:
bi,t+1 ≤ ψ (3)
Consumers choose consumption, savings and labor supply by maximizing
(1) subject to the budget constraint (2), and to the exogenous borrowing
constraint (3). The first order conditions for the intertemporal choice are
7
given by an Euler equation and by a complementary slackness condition:6
uc(ci,t, Gt) = βEt [uc(ci,t+1, Gt+1)(1 + rt)] + µi,t (4)
µi,t(bi,t+1 − ψ) = 0 (5)
The employed agents’ intratemporal first order condition for the labor
supply is given by:
νl(li,t) = uc(Ci,t)wt(1− τt). (6)
2.2 Final Good Sector
The final good sector is populated by a continuum of firms producing under
perfect competition. They have access to a constant returns to scale technol-
ogy, allowing for aggregation into a representative firm. The representative
firm transforms units of intermediate goods, y(j), into final output, Y :
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
y(j)
−1
 dj
] 
−1
(7)
where  is the parameter governing the elasticity of substitution across inter-
mediate goods.
Demand for intermediate inputs arising from profit maximization of the
final good-producing firm is given by:
y(j) =
(
p(j)
P
)−
Yt (8)
where p(j) is the nominal price of each intermediate input and P is the price
of the final good, defined as:
P =
(∫ 1
0
p(j)1−dj
) 1
1−
.
6I denote with uc(.) the partial derivative of the function u(.) with respect to c. Con-
sistently, I denote with νl(.) the derivative of the function ν(.) with respect to l.
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2.3 Intermediate Good Sector
The intermediate good sector is populated by a continuum of identical firms
of measure one. Each firm j has access to the following decreasing returns
to scale technology:
y(j) = n(j)ω, (9)
allowing it to transform labor input n(j) into output of a differentiated good,
y(j). The parameter ω governs the elasticity of output with respect to labor
input.
Each firm j competes under monopolistic competition with the other
firms in its sector to meet the demand schedule (8).
Every firm is subject to a quadratic cost of adjusting nominal prices,
which is measured in units of aggregate final output following Rotemberg
(1982):
φ(pt(j), pt−1(j), Yt) =
ϕ
2
(
pt(j)
pt−1(j)Π¯
− 1
)2
Yt
where Π¯ is the steady state inflation rate and ϕ > 0 determines the degree
of nominal rigidity.
The firms maximize the present discounted sum of profits
Ξ(j) =
∞∑
t=0
βtλt$˜t(j) (10)
subject to (8) and (9), where the per-period profit is
$˜t(j) ≡
[
pt(j)
Pt
yt(j)− wt(j)nt(j)− φ(pt(j), pt−1(j), Yt)
]
and
λt ≡
∫ 1
0
uc(ci,t, Gt)di
is a weighted average of agent-specific stochastic discount factors. 7 Due to
the lack of aggregate uncertainty and firm-level idiosyncratic uncertainty I
can neglect the expectation operator.
7Note that E˜$t =
∫ 1
0
$˜t(j)dj.
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In this sector, all the firms, facing the same costs and demand schedule,
will make identical choices. This allows me to omit the j index. In particular,
they will all set the same price p(j) = p = P , and produce the same amount,
y(j) = y = Y .
The first order condition for the firms with respect to their individual
price can be written as follows:
wt =
ω
µ
Y
1− 1
ω
t +
ϕω

(
Πt
Π¯
− 1
)
Πt
Π¯
Y
1− 1
ω
t − β
λt+1
λt
ϕω

(
Πt+1
Π¯
− 1
)
Πt+1
Π¯
Yt+1
Y
1
ω
t
(11)
where µ ≡ 
−1 is the steady state markup of prices over marginal costs
and Πt ≡ PtPt−1 is the gross inflation rate.8
Equation (11) describes the firms’ output supply: output responds nega-
tively to an increase in the real wage. If inflation is close to the steady state,
output responds positively to an increase in current inflation and negatively
to an increase in future inflation.
2.4 Fiscal Authority, Social Security and Central Bank
The fiscal authority provides Gt units of a non-rival consumption good in
every period. Public expenditure is financed either by charging taxes on the
agents’ income flows or by issuing a bond in terms of consumption good BGt ,
the return on which, also denominated in units of the consumption good, is
the real interest rate, rt. A positive value of B
G stands for public debt. The
budget constraint of the fiscal authority is:
τtwt
∫
i∈L
li,tdi+ τt$˜t = Gt − B
G
t+1
(1 + rt)
+BGt (12)
The social security scheme runs a balanced budget. Aggregate unem-
ployment benefits are financed in each period by the workers’ contributions:
L˜ρt = σtU˜ . (13)
9
8A full derivation of this expression is relegated to the Appendix.
9U˜ and L˜ have been defined in subsection 2.1 as the mass of unemployed and employed
agents, respectively.
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The real interest rate is determined by the Fisher equation:
(1 + rt) =
(1 + it)
Πt+1
where it is the nominal interest rate at time t and Πt+1 is the gross inflation
between time t and t + 1. Note that Πt+1 is in the information set of the
agents due to the assumption of perfect foresight.
The policy is simple: the objective of the central bank is to maintain
inflation on target, Π¯, whenever possible. Otherwise, if this implies a negative
nominal rate, it fixes the interest rate, it, at zero:{
Πt = Π¯ if it ≥ 0
it = 0 otherwise.
(14)
Since the nominal interest rate cannot be negative, the real rate must be
greater than the inverse of future inflation, i.e.
(1 + rt) ≥ 1
Πt+1
. (15)
2.5 Market Clearing Conditions
The goods, assets and labor markets clear. I will now describe in turn all the
market clearing conditions.
The goods market clears:∫ 1
0
ci,tdi+Gt = Yt − φ(Pt, Pt−1, Yt) (16)
where I define
φ(Pt, Pt−1, Yt) ≡ ϕ
2
(
Pt
Pt−1Π¯
− 1
)2
Yt
as the quadratic price adjustment cost in terms of the consumption good as
a function of aggregate current and past prices, Pt and Pt−1 respectively, and
aggregate production, Yt.
10 Due to the assumption of Rotemberg costs, part
of the production is purely wasted and does not enter the agents’ consump-
tion.
10I exploit the fact that all firms take the same decision in equilibrium.
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The assets market clears:
BGt+1 +
∫ 1
0
bi,t+1di = 0. (17)
By Walras’s law, the labor market also clears:
nt −
(∫
i∈L
li,tdi
)
= 0 (18)
where I can write n(j) = n, exploiting the fact that in equilibrium all the
firms make the same choices. I am also implicitly assuming that the hours
supplied by different employed agents are perfect substitutes from the point
of view of the firms. This is consistent with the fact that the employed agents
only differ in terms of wealth and not productivity.
2.6 Equilibrium
Given a sequence of taxes, social security contributions, public expenditure
{τt, %, Gt}∞t=0, prices {rt, it, wt}∞t=0, and the inflation targeting policy (14), let
the policy rules for c and l at time t as a function of the individual state
of the agents be ct(s, b) and lt(s, b) for a household with employment status
si,t = s and initial bond holding bi,t = b. These two decision rules pin down
the endogenous transition of the agents’ bond holdings.
I define the joint distribution of assets and employment statuses at the
beginning of the period as Ψt(s, b). The transition for the agents’ bond
holdings, together with the exogenous Markov process for employment sta-
tuses determines the endogenous joint transition probability for agent-specific
state variables. These are sufficient to characterize the next-period asset and
employment status joint distribution,Ψt+1(s, b). I can now define the equi-
librium.
Definition 1. Given a sequence of taxes, social security contributions, public
expenditure {τt, %, Gt}∞t=0, the inflation targeting policy (14), an initial joint
distribution of employment statuses and assets, Ψ0(b, s), and an initial price
vector {p0(j)}1j=0, an equilibrium is a sequence of prices {rt, it, wt}∞t=0, alloca-
tions, {ct(s, b), lt(s, b), bt+1(s, b), Yt}∞t=0, and a sequence of joint distributions
for bond holdings and employment statuses, {Ψt(s, b)}∞t=0, such that given
Ψ0(b, s) and {p0(j)}1j=0 :
12
• {ct(s, b), lt(s, b), bt+1(s, b), Yt}∞t=0 are optimal given {rt, it, wt}∞t=0, {τt, %, Gt,Πt}∞t=0
and the inflation targeting policy (14);
• {Ψt(s, b)}∞t=0 are consistent with the decision rule and the exogenous
transition probability;
• The goods, assets and labor markets clear, (16), (17) and (18);11
• The fiscal authority budget constraint is satisfied, (12);
• The social security budget constraint is satisfied, (13);
• The nominal interest rate and inflation rate are consistent with (14).
3 Calibration
The model is simulated at quarterly frequency. I assume that u(c,G) takes
the following CRRA form:
u(c,G) ≡ f(c,G)
(1−γ)
(1− γ)
where γ is a parameter ruling the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and
the degree of risk aversion. I set γ = 1.5 in line with the literature.
The agents’ private consumption and public expenditure are aggregated
by means of a CES function:
f(c,G) ≡
[
α
1
χ c
χ−1
χ + (1− α) 1χGχ−1χ
] χ
χ−1
where χ is the parameter that governs the elasticity of substitution between
public expenditure and private consumption and α is the parameter that
defines the share of private consumption out of total consumption. I assume
that χ = 3, so that publicly provided goods and private consumption are
imperfect substitutes and α = .9. I will experiment in the Appendix with
different values for χ in order to show how the results change when public
expenditure and private consumption are imperfect complements.
11One of the three equations is redundant due to Walras’s law.
13
In line with the literature on Real Business Cycles, I assume that labor
disutility is of the type:
ν(l) ≡ l
1+η
1 + η
where η is the parameter governing the disutility of the labor supply. I set
η = 2, which implies an average Frisch elasticity of the labor supply of .57,
well in line with the admissible range of values in the macro literature.
In line with Quadrini (2000), I put the percentage of entrepreneurs at
14%.12 I set U˜ to equal 0.0626 to match the average United States unem-
ployment rate in 2013, 7.3%. I set L˜ residually.
Following Shimer (2005), I set the transition probability from the un-
employment to the employment status to equal 0.882 and that from the
employment to the unemployment status to equal 0.057. I put the transi-
tion probability from the employment to the entrepreneur status at 0.0830
and from entrepreneur status to employment at 0.403. In order to match
a replacement rate of 40%, again in line with Shimer (2005), I choose the
parameter value % = .4.
I set ψ, the borrowing limit, equal to .95, allowing the agents to borrow
annually up to 29% of the steady state total economy per capita GDP.
I set τ = 0.127 to match the median payroll tax rate in the US in 2010,
according to CBO (2012).13 I put the real debt BG at 0.6451 to match a
value for annual public debt over GDP of 20%. I choose this value for initial
debt to focus on that part of public debt that is held domestically by private
agents. In 2013, the US debt to GDP held by the public excluding the Federal
Reserve System equalled 55%. More than half of this was owned by foreign
investors. Hence, considering a value of 20% does not seem implausible to
describe US variables. Due to the non-linearities characterizing this model,
it would be very difficult to find transition equilibria for all the exercises I
consider with a higher level of public debt. Secondly, I want some agents to
act as borrowers in this economy, and this would be not possible with very
high government debt.
I set β = 0.9807 to match an annual real interest rate in the initial steady
state of 2.6%, in line with historical US data. 14 The annual inflation rate is
equal to 2%, in line with the average US inflation rate since the year 2000.
12One of the estimated values for the percentage of self-employed in that paper is 13.7%.
13Effective Marginal Tax Rates for Low-and Moderate-Income Workers.
14In the final steady state, to be defined in Section 5, the real interest rate equals 2.5%.
14
The intra-temporal elasticity of substitution among different inputs, , is
put at 7, in line with the literature and implying a markup of 16.7%. I set
ω, the parameter that governs the elasticity of output with respect to labor
input, equal to 0.75, in line with the literature that puts this parameter
between .66 and 1. Finally, I set the Rotemberg cost parameter at ϕ = 68.2.
This matches, at first order approximation, price rigidities a´ la Calvo, where
only 25% of firms can adjust their prices in each quarter.15
Given the strong non-linearities present in the model, the solution method
adopted is based on a global method. The details are provided in the Ap-
pendix.
15In line with Smets and Wouters (2003) and De Walque, Smets and Wouters (2005).
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4 Steady State
Let us now describe the initial steady state. First of all, I calibrate the model
to match the inequality in wealth distribution in the spirit of Castan˜eda et al.
(2003). Figure 2 shows the policy function for asset accumulation, namely
the difference between current and future debt as a ratio of per capita GDP,
bGDPt − bGDPt+1 , as a function of current assets as a ratio of per capita GDP.
In this class of model, the borrowing-saving decisions of individual agents
are endogenous functions of predetermined individual states and aggregate
variables. Figure 2 shows whether an agent in a given employment status
with a given predetermined asset is increasing or decreasing his stock of
assets. A positive value for bGDPt −bGDPt+1 means that agents are accumulating
assets, while a negative one means they are decumulating assets. Unemployed
agents, if not close to the borrowing constraint, are the ones whose savings
reduce the most. This is consistent with the fact that they are in the worst
employment status. Thus, once an agent becomes unemployed, he begins to
run down his assets. The employed also decumulate their assets, but at a
lower pace than the unemployed. Entrepreneurs, instead, always accumulate
bonds. This occurs since they are in the best employment status, consistent
with the standard permanent income hypothesis.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of assets as a percentage of per capita
GDP in the initial steady state by employment status. In equilibrium, the
employed agents are the least wealthy. On the other hand, the entrepreneurs
are net savers and the wealthiest agents in the model economy. Despite
being the agents whose savings reduce the most, the wealth distribution
of the unemployed lies slightly to the right of the wealth distribution of the
employed. In fact, the distribution of assets depends on both the endogenous
policy function and on the exogenous Markov chain. Data for the United
States and evidence presented by Shimer (2005) suggest that there is more
persistency in the employed status than in the unemployed one. An agent
who is unemployed today, therefore, is likely to have been in a different
employment status yesterday. Hence, despite the fact that, once unemployed,
he will start to run down his assets, he is likely to have been subject to a
different policy function in the past. As a consequence, in equilibrium, the
unemployed agents turn out to be slightly wealthier than the employed.
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Figure 2: Policy Function for Asset Accumulation.
The figure shows the difference between current and future debt as a percentage of per
capita GDP , bGDPt − bGDPt+1 , as a function of current assets as a ratio of per capita
GDP. All three employment statuses are represented: unemployed (first panel), employed
(second panel) and entrepreneurs (third panel). Positive values are associated with asset
accumulation; negative values with asset decumulation.
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Figure 3: Wealth Distribution.
The figure shows the distribution of assets as a percentage of per capita GDP in the initial
steady state by employment status: unemployed (first panel), employed (second panel)
and entrepreneurs (third panel).
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5 Quantitive Exercise
The goal of this paper is to understand the optimal way to implement an
austerity plan along two dimensions: the timing of the debt reduction and
the fiscal instruments to adopt.
To address this question, I consider a scenario under which the fiscal
authority is forced to bring down its debt from a high level, BGH , to a low one,
BGL in a determined time span, T . Such a debt reduction episode does not
need to be optimal. The reasons behind the implementation of the austerity
plan are not the object of discussion of this paper and are left unmodeled.
Nevertheless, we can think of many recent cases where countries have been
forced to implement debt reduction plans. For example, this path could be
imposed by the existence of a supranational authority overseeing domestic
fiscal policy or, implicitly, by international investors in financial markets.
Note that an infinite number of paths are available to the fiscal authority
to converge to the new steady state. I restrict my analysis to a class of
monotonic decreasing deleveraging paths. This seems consistent with casual
empirical evidence: as southern European economies implemented austerity
measures in response to the recent sovereign debt crisis, the proposed plans
for public borrowing generally implied a monotonically decreasing path for
public debt.
I model the path of public debt deleveraging as:
BGt = B
G
H + (B
G
L −BGH)
(
t
T
)ι
where the parameter ι governs the concavity or convexity of the public debt
reduction plan. I restrict ι to values in the positive subset of R. As Figure 4
shows, ι is also a measure of the speed of public deleveraging. I define a path
where ι < 1 as a fast debt reduction episode. On the other hand, I define a
path where ι > 1 as a slow debt reduction episode. I refer to a deleveraging
path where ι is around unity as a smooth one. Mapping the speed of debt
reduction into a single parameter, ι, helps to clarify the analysis of the results.
As already described in Section 3, I set BGH equal to 0.6452 in order to
match an initial public debt as a percentage of GDP of 20%. I reduce debt
to BGL equalling .5809, implying a value for annual public debt over GDP of
18%. The 2 percentage point reduction may seem small. However, given my
desire to study extremely slow and fast debt reduction paths, considering a
larger debt deleveraging episode, even if realistic, would not allow a complete
20
analysis of the results. For some values of ι, in fact, it would not to be
possible for the economy to converge to an equilibrium. Deleveraging from
high to low debt takes place in one year (T = 4). This choice mimics yearly
implementation of fiscal plans.
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Figure 4: Deleveraging Paths According to Different Values of ι
A ι < 1 (blue continuous line) represents a convex (fast) deleveraging, a ι = 1 (red dotted
line) stands for a smooth deleveraging, while a ι > 1 (green dotted line) represents a
concave (slow) deleveraging.
I define the initial (final) steady state as an equilibrium of the economy
where all the aggregate variables are constant, the agents are subject to
idiosyncratic uncertainty, the assets and employment statuses distribution is
the ergodic one and public debt is constant at BGH (B
G
L ). At time t = 1 the
economy begins the transition from the initial steady state to the final one.
The agents become aware at time t = 1 of the path of public debt described
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above. From t = 1 onwards, they have perfect foresight again of the path of
the aggregate variables.
I restrict the analysis to public debt deleveraging episodes that are brought
about via one of the following fiscal instruments: income taxation or pub-
lic expenditure. I choose only to study these two instruments due to their
opposite impact on the real interest rate. I will show below how this vari-
able plays a key role in determining many of the aggregate results. At the
aggregate level, considering other types of taxation, such as consumption or
wealth taxation, is unlikely to affect my conclusions significantly. At the
individual level, it is possible that the introduction of different types of taxa-
tion may modify some of the agents’ preferences. However, I choose to focus
on a smaller set of fiscal instruments in order to simplify the analysis of the
model.
I now turn to defining the welfare measure I consider in the rest of the
analysis. Let the initial steady state value function of agent i, with debt bi,t
and employment status si,t, be:
J¯(bi,0, si,0) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt (u(ci,t(bi,t, si,t), G0)− ν(li,t(bi,t, si,t))
where I define ci,t(bi,t, si,t) and li,t(bi,t, si,t) as the optimal consumption and
labor decisions of agent i at time t. I denote with G0 public expenditure
at the initial steady state. It is understood that the path of the aggregate
variables is in the information set of the agents and is summarized, where
relevant, by the time subscript t.
Let agent i’s value function at the beginning of the transition be:
J(bi,0, si,0, ι, ζ) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt (u(ci,t(bi,t, si,t, ι, ζ), Gt)− ν(li,t(bi,t, si,t, ι, ζ))
where ζ is an indicator function taking value one if public debt reduction is
achieved by a cut in public expenditure and zero otherwise. To evaluate this
value function, the agents take into account the future path of the aggre-
gate variables along the transition of debt towards its new value, BGL . The
variables ζ and ι are sufficient statistics to characterize the path of all the
aggregate variables, given BGL and B
G
H . I can now define the consumption
equivalent as the permanent constant amount of consumption agent i would
like to receive in the initial steady state to avoid the fluctuating path of
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consumption and labor associated with the transition, namely:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt (u(ci,t(bi,t, si,t, X) + ξi · ci,0(bi,0, si,0, X), Gt)− ν(li,t(bi,t, si,t, X)) = J(bi,0, si,0, X, ι, ζ)
Note that, given my definition, a positive ξi stands for a welfare benefit
associated with the transition, while a negative ξi stands for a welfare cost. I
summarize the welfare of individual agents by their consumption equivalent,
ξi.
6 Flexible Price Benchmark
I consider an economy where the central bank is always able to set the infla-
tion rate at its target, Π¯, even if this violates the non-negativity constraint
for the nominal interest rate. This coincides with a model with flexible prices
and it is the benchmark for my analysis.
6.1 Aggregate Variables in a Deleveraging Episode
In this subsection, I analyze how the aggregate variables react to a public
debt reduction achieved by using different fiscal instruments, for different
values of ι. As explained in Section 5, I assume that the fiscal authority can
use either public expenditure or income taxation to deleverage.
In order to make the two exercises comparable, the initial and final steady
states must be the same independently of the instrument used by the fiscal
authority during the transition. I assume, then, that when the fiscal authority
deleverages by increasing income taxation, public expenditure increases by a
constant fraction for the first four quarters. Hence, in both exercises, at t = 5
the tax rate and public expenditure are at the final steady state level. This
allows me to compare the two transitions. Later in the paper, I show that
this assumption does not affect the results significantly in terms of welfare.
Figure 5 shows the impulse response functions for the different exercises
I consider.
Let us now analyze the effects of a public debt reduction achieved by
cutting public expenditure, as shown in the first column of Figure 5. When
most of the reduction in G occurs, the real interest rate decreases. Indeed,
under this circumstance, the fiscal authority is creating a negative demand
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shock in the economy. Aggregate private consumption, instead, increases for
two reasons: on the one hand, consumers are paid back part of the principal
of the public debt; on the other hand, due to the assumption of imperfect
substitutability, private consumption partly replaces public expenditure. As
a consequence, output falls by less than G. Moreover, the decrease in the
real interest rate has a feedback effect on public expenditure. The fiscal
authority, indeed, being a borrower, has to finance lower interest payments.
Hence, the response of the real interest rate and private consumption helps
the deleveraging process.
The above description refers to a fast debt deleveraging where almost all
of the debt reduction occurs in the first quarter (Figure 5, ι = 0.3). If most
of the debt reduction occurs instead in the future, the agents’ expectations
at t = 1 will adjust (Figure 5, ι = 4). Consumers are aware that their
consumption will increase in the future. They are therefore willing to borrow
in the present to smooth consumption. Their borrowing exerts an upward
pressure on the current real interest rate. The fiscal authority, facing a
higher real interest rate, is forced to cut public expenditure even in the first
quarter. The first-period increase in private consumption offsets the drop
in public expenditure, causing an increase in output. Then, if the drop in
public expenditure occurs in the future, the economy experiences a public
expenditure contraction and a slight output boom in the present.
Let us now assume that the fiscal authority decides to reduce public debt
by increasing income taxation. Under this circumstance, when most of the
debt reduction occurs the economy is hit by a supply shock. The employed
agents, facing higher taxation, supply less labor. The firms, in response,
cut production. The real interest rate will then increase, raising the interest
payment for the fiscal authority. At the same time, due to the taxation
increase and to the contraction in output, private consumption falls. Hence,
when taxation increases the economy faces a recession in output as well as
in private consumption.
Once again, the previous description fits well a public deleveraging that
occurs mostly in the first quarter (Figure 5, ι = 0.2). If, instead, the public
deleveraging is expected to occur in the future (Figure 5, ι = 3), the agents’
expectations adjust accordingly. Consumers, aware of the consumption drop
at t = 4, are willing to save at t = 3. As a consequence, in the third quarter
the real interest rate falls, allowing the fiscal authority to decrease the tax
rate. The workers supply more labor, expanding current output. Therefore,
the economy faces an increase in output at t = 3 and a strong recession at
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Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions under Different Deleveraging Speeds
Impulse Response Functions for public expenditure, G, income taxation, τ , real interest
rate, r, output, Y , and private consumption, C, according to different values for ι. ι = .3
represents a fast debt reduction, ι = 1 represents a smooth debt reduction and ι = 3
represents a slow debt reduction. In the first column, the public debt reduction is financed
by cutting public expenditure. In the second column, the public debt reduction is financed
by increasing income taxation. All the variables, except for r and τ , are in log-deviations
from the final steady state values. The values for r and τ are given in percentages.
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t = 4.
To summarize, by using public expenditure, it is possible to reduce the
real interest rate and prevent the output from falling much. Instead, by in-
creasing income taxation the real interest rate rises and depresses the output
significantly.
6.2 Aggregate Preferences
Egalitarian Aggregation and Voting Results
I analyze the aggregate preferences according to two different metrics: the
aggregate consumption equivalent, ξ ≡ ∫ 1
0
ξidi, and the outcome of a vot-
ing process. The former solves the problem of an egalitarian fiscal authority
which maximizes aggregate welfare behind the veil of ignorance, where the
weights are given by the probability distribution of the agents. The lat-
ter corresponds, instead, to a decentralized voting process where the agents
choose between two alternatives: a reduction in public expenditure or an
increase in income taxation.
The results are plotted in Figure 6. The first panel shows the aggregate
ξ under the public expenditure experiment and under income taxation, ac-
cording to different speeds of debt reduction, ξG(ι) and ξτ (ι), respectively.
The second panel, instead, shows the percentage of agents who vote in favor
of a public debt deleveraging achieved by reducing public expenditure.
I do not want to focus my analysis either on the magnitude of the welfare
costs or on the sign, since in this class of models public debt, acting as insur-
ance provider for the agents, is welfare-enhancing. My analysis focuses on a
comparison between different instruments and different speeds of deleverag-
ing. The differences in welfare, then, only depend on the transition path and
they are independent of the final steady state.
Let us now analyze the results. First, the two criteria give similar answers:
public expenditure cuts are preferred for almost all debt reduction speeds.
This occurs since the real interest rate is relatively low during the transition,
making the public debt deleveraging less costly. In addition, income taxation
increases distortions in the economy, lowering the agents’ welfare.
Second, in very slow debt reduction episodes, the income taxation exper-
iment is preferred to the public expenditure one when measuring aggregate
welfare with ξ. Under the voting criterion, the public expenditure option al-
ways beats the income taxation one. Nevertheless, the percentage of agents
in favor of public expenditure drops considerably for extremely slow debt
26
Figure 6: Aggregate Preferences
The first panel shows the aggregate consumption equivalent, ξ, as a function of public
debt deleveraging speed, ι, both under the public expenditure experiment and under the
income taxation one. The second panel shows the percentage of agents who vote in favor
of the public expenditure option as a function of the public debt deleveraging speed.
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reductions. Under high values of ι, the benefits of having low interest rates
during the debt reduction will fall. Indeed, as shown in Figure 5, in the
first three quarters the economy experiences high real interest rates and low
public expenditure. These two factors together depress the welfare of the less
wealthy agents, thus depressing aggregate welfare.
Finally, for low values of ι, even if the difference between ξG(ι) and ξτ (ι)
is large, the difference in voting is not. This means that fast debt reductions
achieved by income taxation are very costly for some agents. The class
disliking this option most is that of the employed borrowers, due to the
combination of high real interest rates and high taxes.
Voting among Four Alternatives
I will now describe a voting experiment. The Agents can choose among four
options: a fast debt reduction achieved by income taxation (ι = .3), a fast
debt reduction achieved by public expenditure (ι = .3), a slow debt reduction
achieved by income taxation (ι = 4) and a slow debt reduction achieved by
public expenditure (ι = 4).16
Figure 7.a shows the results of the vote: The winning option is fast debt
reduction achieved by public expenditure. This occurs since it is the preferred
option of the majority of the employed agents, who represent, in turn, the
majority of the population in this economy. The second most voted option
is the fast debt reduction achieved by income taxation. This is voted for by
all the wealthier agents whose major source of income is financial wealth.
The agents’ preferences, disaggregated by employment status and position
in the wealth distribution within the employment statuses, are described in
Figure 7.b. Notice that a general pattern emerges: agents below the median
of the wealth distribution prefer a debt reduction achieved by public expen-
diture; agents above the median prefer, instead, a debt reduction achieved
by income taxation.
The poorest unemployed prefer a slow debt reduction achieved by income
taxation. These agents dislike low public expenditure and, being borrowers,
high real interest rates. Hence, they do not want the fiscal authority to
decrease public expenditure and they do not vote for fast debt reduction with
income taxation, as this would increase real interest rates. The wealthiest,
instead, prefer a fast debt reduction achieved by income taxation, since they
mostly rely on financial wealth. Under this option, they can then enjoy a
16Figure 5 shows the impulse response functions for these options.
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Figure 7: Voting Outcomes among Four Alternatives
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high real interest rate without facing an increase in fiscal pressure. The
unemployed agents between the 10th and 30th wealth percentiles vote for
a fast debt reduction under public expenditure. This occurs since they are
borrowers and prefer to face low real interest rates.
The employed agents, if wealthy, vote for a fast debt reduction achieved by
income taxation; if not, they prefer a fast debt reduction obtained by public
expenditure. The wealthy employed, holding a large quantity of assets, prefer
to face high real interest rates when their savings are high, namely, in the first
quarter. Employed agents who are not very wealthy rely on labor income:
they enjoy a low interest rate and a low distortion of the labor supply.
The entrepreneurs’ preferences are, again, significantly affected by wealth.
The less wealthy agents vote for a slow debt reduction achieved by public
expenditure. Indeed, relying on profit income, they dislike high taxation
and, being borrowers, they dislike high interest rates. The wealthier vote
for a slow debt reduction via income taxation. Their motivations are very
different from those of the poor unemployed. Under this option, as described
in subsection 6.1 and shown in Figure 5, the movements in the real interest
rate and profit income are negatively correlated, thus providing them with a
favorably smooth path of income. The very wealthy among the entrepreneurs
vote for a fast debt reduction achieved by an increase in the tax rate. Relying
mostly on financial income, they like the real interest rate to be high in the
first quarter.
Preferences Regarding Different Speeds of Deleveraging
I will now analyze whether the speed of debt reduction is an important
variable in determing the agents’ preferences. Figure 6 shows that this vari-
able matters under the egalitarian welfare metric. Indeed, an egalitarian
fiscal authority prefers, indeed, a fast debt reduction, if it is constrained in
using public expenditure, and a slow debt reduction, if it is constrained in
using income taxation.
Let us now study if, under a voting experiment, the same result arises. I
fix a fiscal instrument and I let the agents vote, in turn, between two alter-
natives: fast or slow public debt deleveraging.17 Figure 8 shows the results
of this vote. Not surprisingly,18 under the public expenditure option, the
17I check that adding a smooth debt reduction (ι = 1) among the options does not
change the results much. Hence, for the sake of clarity I drop this option.
18A slow debt reduction achieved by public expenditure was preferred by more than 50%
of the agents in the previous experiment, which included a larger set of options. Therefore,
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majority of agents vote for a fast debt reduction. Under the income taxation
option, the agents vote for a slow debt reduction, changing considerably the
result of the voting outcome in the previous paragraph.19 Indeed, most of
the agents who voted for a slow public debt deleveraging under public expen-
diture, will vote for a fast public debt deleveraging under income taxation.
These two processes have something in common. They make it possible to
have a low interest rate when public debt is high and a high interest rate
when public debt is low, easing the costs of public deleveraging.
To conclude, both for the egalitarian fiscal authority and for the voting
mechanism, it is optimal to perform a fast public debt deleveraging if it
is achieved by public expenditure and a slow public debt deleveraging if
achieved by income taxation. Therefore, it is possible to state that the public
debt deleveraging speed plays an important role in determining the agents’
preferences.
6.3 Disaggregated Preferences
I now turn to studing the disaggregated preferences of the agents. Fig-
ures 9, 10 and 11 show the aggregate consumption equivalent by quartile
and by employment status, as a function of the public debt deleveraging
speed.
Consider a debt reduction achieved through a cut in public expenditure.
The position in the wealth distribution is the variable affecting the agents’
preferences the most . The more an agent is wealthy the slower is his pre-
ferred public deleveraging path. Borrowers want a low interest rate when
debt is high while savers prefer exactly the opposite. Moreover, the least
wealthy unemployed agents face a trade-off: being unemployed, they want
to prevent public expenditure from falling much; as borrowers, they want
the real interest rate to fall the most. They choose a fast debt reduction,
experiencing a substantial public expenditure reduction in order to gain a
low interest rate.
Consider a debt reduction achieved through an increase in income taxa-
tion. Under this circumstance, their employment status plays an important
role in agents’ preferences. The unemployed, if not close to the borrowing
constraint, gain more utility in a fast debt reduction. Mostly relying on
once I restrict the set of possible choices, the same result needs to arise.
19The agents’ second-best option was a fast debt reduction achieved by income taxation.
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Figure 8: Voting Outcomes for Deleveraging Speed
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Figure 9: Unemployed Consumption Equivalent
Mean of the average consumption by quartile as a function of the speed of debt reduc-
tion for the unemployed. The dark green continuous line represents the income taxation
experiment; the red dotted line the public expenditure experiment.
33
Figure 10: Employed Consumption Equivalent
Mean of the average consumption by quartile as a function of the speed of debt reduction
for the employed.The dark green continuous line represents the income taxation experi-
ment; the red dotted line the public expenditure experiment.
34
Figure 11: Entrepreneurs Consumption Equivalent
Mean of the average consumption by quartile as a function of the speed of debt reduction
for the entrepreneurs. The dark green continuous line represents the income taxation
experiment; the red dotted line the public expenditure experiment.
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financial wealth, they prefer to have a high real interest rate in the first
quarter. This is also optimal because they do not face any distortionary
taxation. The employed, if below the median of wealth distribution, prefer
a slow debt reduction; otherwise, a fast one. Relying on labor income, the
former want to minimize the distortion due to taxation. Relying mostly on
financial income, the latter want to maximize the pressure on the real interest
rate. The entrepreneurs are better off under an extremely slow debt reduc-
tion. As Figure 5 shows, when a debt reduction occurs slowly, the economy
faces a cycle of high taxes under high real interest rates and low taxes under
low real interest rates. The entrepreneurs, being savers, gain from high real
interest rates and, being tax-payers, gain from low taxation. Thus, they get
more utility by having an extremely slow debt reduction that exacerbates
this process. Note that the reason why they prefer a slow debt deleveraging
is different from that for the employed. The latter minimize tax distortion,
while the former maximize the taxes-real interest rate cycle.
To conclude, if the central bank is always able to target inflation, public
debt reduction needs to be achieved by means of public expenditure and needs
to be fast. If it is not possible to cut public expenditure, the fiscal authority
must slowly reduce public debt using income taxation. These results are
robust to different welfare metrics. Nevertheless, note that in some equilibria,
the nominal interest rate violates the non-negativity constraint implied by
equation (14). I will now turn to analyzing how the presence of the zero
lower bound affects the results.
7 Nominal Price Rigidities and the Zero Lower
Bound
In this section, I assume that the central bank needs to satisfy the non-
negativity constraint on the nominal interest rate, namely equation (14).
Note that if the constraint does not bind, the central bank targets the in-
flation rate and the results are those described in Section 6. If, instead, the
constraint binds, some of the equilibria described in Section 6 are not fea-
sible. Then, the central bank sets the nominal interest rate equal to zero,
leaving the inflation rate free to float.
Under this circumstance, the economy is subject to two different effects:
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one at the aggregate and one at the individual level. At the aggregate level,
if the zero lower bound binds, output falls and inflation is below the target.
This occurs because of a known mechanism in the literature, described by
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) among others.20 Let us suppose that the
equilibrium nominal interest rate violates the non-negativity constraint only
at time t. The real interest rate is determined by the Fisher equation:
(1 + rt) =
(1 + it)
(1 + Πt+1)
where Πt+1 is the inflation rate at time t+ 1, set by the central bank at the
target Π¯. I define rBt as the real interest rate under the benchmark case and
rZLBt the real interest rate under the zero lower bound. Then:
(1 + rBt ) =
(1 + it)
(1 + Π¯)
≤ 1
(1 + Π¯)
= (1 + rZLBt )
Consequently, once the non-negativity constraint on the nominal interest rate
is in place, the agents face a higher real interest rate. They choose, therefore,
to save more, depressing the aggregate demand. The equilibrium price level
decreases, pushing inflation below the target.
In this model, a second effect is present. At the individual level, the
zero lower bound indirectly redistributes resources from the employed to the
entrepreneurs or viceversa. This mechanism is triggered by the contempora-
neous presence of below-target inflation and Rotemberg costs. Rearranging
equation (11) and the per-period profits, I obtain expressions for the average
labor income as a share of GDP and profits as a share of GDP:
wtnt
Yt
=
(
ω
µ
+
φω

(Π˜t − 1)Π˜t − βλt+1Yt+1
λtYt
φω

(Π˜t+1 − 1)Π˜t+1
)
(19)
and
$t
Yt
=
(
1− ω
µ
− φω

(Π˜t − 1)Π˜t − φ
2
(Π˜t − 1)2 + βλt+1Yt+1
λtYt
φω

(Π˜t+1 − 1)Π˜t+1
)
(20)
where Π˜ ≡ Πt
Π
. The current below-target inflation, Π˜t ≤ 1, depresses the
labor income share and, under certain conditions, it increases the profits
share. 21 Indeed, facing low prices, the firms cut their labor demand and
20Adam and Billi (2006),(2007), Eggertsson and Woodford (2004) and Werning (2011).
21 (ω +
1
2 )Π˜t >
1
2 .
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depress real wages. Conversely, below-target future inflation, Π˜t+1 ≤ 1, is
positively correlated with the labor income share and it decreases the profits
share. The firms, aware that prices will decrease in the future, want to
increase current production. They demand more labor, exerting an upward
pressure on the real wage. The net redistributitive effect of current and future
inflation on the labor income share is given by:
ht ≡ (Π˜t − 1)Π˜t − βλt+1Yt+1
λtYt
(Π˜t+1 − 1)Π˜t+1
If, indeed, ht ≥ 0 (ht < 0), resources will be redistributed from the en-
trepreneurs (employed) to the employed (entrepreneurs).
Note that this income reallocation has a strong consequence. Most of the
entrepreneurs in the model are financially-unconstrained agents, while some
of the employed agents are financially-constrained. The inflation path can,
then, move resources from the constrained to the unconstrained agents or
viceversa, making, in turn, the borrowing constraint more or less stringent.
As a consequence, it is not trivial to state ex-ante whether the presence of
the zero lower bound will have a negative or positive effect on the economy.
I now turn to analyzing the aggregate variable dynamics during a public
deleveraging episode when considering the presence of the zero lower bound
on the nominal interest rate. Then, I will study how the presence of the
non-negativity constraint on the nominal interest rate affects the welfare and
preferences of the agents.
7.1 Aggregate Variables under Zero Lower Bound
The zero lower bound may bind both when the fiscal authority reduces public
debt by increasing income taxation and by cutting public expenditure. Let
us analyze what occurs when public debt deleveraging is achieved by cutting
public expenditure and the non-negativity constraint on the nominal interest
rate may bind. First, the economy faces the zero lower bound only under
an over-fast or an over-slow debt reduction. Indeed, in this experiment, the
real interest rate is low only when most of the deleveraging shock occurs.
Secondly, despite the fact that the non-negativity constraint may bind, the
economy will never enter a prolonged liquidity trap. In effect, if the debt
reduction is too fast, from the second quarter onwards it converges to the new
steady state. If, instead, debt reduction is too slow, the agents’ expectation
will adjust accordingly. Since they know that output recession will be mild
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and private consumption will be high in the last quarter, they will be willing
to borrow more in the first three quarters. This puts an upward pressure
on the real interest rate during these quarters, preventing the economy from
entering a prolonged liquidity trap. Therefore, the zero lower bound binds,
if it does, either in the first or in the last quarter.
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Figure 12: Impulse Response Functions
Impulse Response Functions for public expenditure, G, output, Y , real wage, w, and
nominal interest rate under the benchmark exercise (continuous blue line) and the zero
lower bound (red dashed line). I set ι = .1 in the first column and ι = 10 in the second
column. All the variables except for i are in log-deviations from the final steady state
values. The values for i are given in percentages.
Figure 12 shows the impulse response functions under ι = .1 (first col-
umn) and ι = 10 (second column). The presence of the zero lower bound
does not significantly change the behavior of the aggregate variables for two
reasons. First, under this deleveraging shock the nominal interest rate is
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slightly below zero. Second, since the non-negativity constraint binds only
for one quarter, it does not have a big effect on the economy. When the zero
lower bound binds, the fiscal authority must pay a higher interest rate than
under the flexible price experiment. As a consequence, public expenditure
drops. Due to the imperfect substitutability, the fall in public expenditure
induces an increase in private consumption, preventing the aggregate demand
from falling. The output recession will be very mild. Hence, at the aggregate
level there is almost no effect. Instead, at the individual level, resources are
reallocated according to the speed of debt reduction. Under low values of
ι, inflation is below the target in the first quarter. The labor income share
decreases since firms hire fewer workers. If, on the other hand, the value of
ι is very high, inflation is below the target at t = 4. At t = 3, the firms
increase their labor demand, raising real wages and inducing an increase in
the labor income share.
Let us now study the effect of public debt deleveraging when it is achieved
through increasing income taxation. The zero lower bound binds only if the
debt reduction is too slow (for high values of ι). Under this circumstance,
indeed, the agents are aware that, in the last quarter, output will fall consid-
erably. In order to smooth consumption, they want to save in the second-to-
last quarter. This exerts a downward pressure on real interest rates, pushing
the nominal interest rate below zero at t = 3. Moreover, once the zero lower
bound binds in the third quarter, the economy may enter a prolonged liq-
uidity trap. Indeed, the agents know that there will be an output recession
even in the third quarter. As a reaction, they want to save at t = 2, exerting
a downward pressure on the nominal interest rate in this quarter as well.
So, it could be possible that the zero lower bound binds even in the second
quarter, depressing the output again. The same recursive reasoning can be
applied to the first quarter. Thus, depending on the magnitude of the output
recession in the fourth quarter, the economy can enter a long or short liq-
uidity trap. Remember that the slower the public debt reduction, the higher
will be the magnitude of the output recession in the last quarter. Conse-
quently, in the event of a very slow public debt reduction, the zero lower
bound binds from the first quarter. This is analyzed in Figure 13, where
I plot the impulse response functions under the benchmark case and under
the zero lower bound when the value of ι = 5. The firms, in response to the
deflation, cut their production from the first quarter. Real wages fall from
the first quarter while the firms’ profits increase. The economy experiences a
long and deep recession where resources are redistributed from the employed
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to the entrepreneurs.
If the debt reduction in the last quarter is not too slow, namely if the
value of ι is not too high, the economy enters a liquidity trap from the second
quarter. This is shown in Figure 14, where I set the value of ι to equal 3.
The nominal interest rate is equal to zero and the inflation rate is below the
target at t = 2 and t = 3. Aware of the path of the inflation rate, the firms
increase their production in the first quarter. Then, at t = 1 real wages,
w, increase and profits, $, fall. Moreover, the firms demand more labor at
t = 2, exerting upward pressure on the real wage, w, even in this quarter.
Hence, if the debt reduction is not too slow, the output recession occurs only
in the last quarter and the employed agents gain while the entrepreneurs lose
in terms of income.
The zero lower bound is more detrimental and influential under the in-
come taxation case than under the public expenditure one. This mainly
depends on the fact that in the former case it binds when private consump-
tion is low, while in the latter it binds when private consumption is high.
Anyhow, it has some consequences for the resource allocation in the econ-
omy in both experiments. Although it is clear who gains and loses in terms
of income, it is not clear who are the winners and losers in terms of welfare.
Therefore, I now turn to analyzing how the introduction of the zero lower
bound can affect the preferences of the agents.
7.2 Aggregate Preferences and the Zero Lower Bound
Egalitarian Aggregation and Voting Results
Let us now study if the presence of the zero lower bound can affect the
agents’ preferences regarding the speed of deleveraging and the fiscal instru-
ment to use. The first panel in Figure 15 shows the aggregate consumption
equivalent ξ, defined in subsection 6.2, under the public expenditure bench-
mark experiment and under the income taxation benchmark experiment, un-
der the public expenditure and income taxation experiment in the presence
of the zero lower bound. The second panel in Figure 15 shows the percentage
of agents who vote in favor of public expenditure against income taxation
for a given value of ι. The dark blue continuous line represents the voting
outcome under the benchmark, while the light blue dashed line represents
the voting outcome under the presence of the zero lower bound.
Once the non-negativity constraint on the nominal interest rate binds,
the preferences of the agents change considerably under the income taxa-
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Figure 13: Impulse Response Functions
Impulse Response Functions for income taxation, τ , output, Y , profits, $, real wage,
W , nominal interest rate, i, and inflation rate, pi = Π − 1 under the benchmark exercise
(continuous blue line) and the zero lower bound (red dashed line). I set ι = 5 to represent
a fast debt reduction. All the variables except for τ , i and pi are in log-deviations from
the final steady state values. The values for τ , i and pi are given in percentages.
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Figure 14: Impulse Response Functions
Impulse Response Functions for income taxation, τ , output, Y , profits, $, real wage, w,
nominal interest rate, i, and net inflation rate, pi = Π − 1 under the benchmark exercise
(continuous blue line) and the zero lower bound (red dashed line). I set ι = 3 to represent
a fast debt reduction. All the variables except for τ , i and pi are in log-deviations from
the final steady state values. The values for τ , i and pi are given in percentages.
43
tion experiment but not under the public expenditure one. From the aggre-
gate consumption equivalent, it is possible to infer that the egalitarian social
planner always finds it optimal to reduce public debt by cutting public ex-
penditure. Remember that in the benchmark experiment, the social planner
finds it optimal for high values of ι to use income taxation. Under the zero
lower bound, instead, in the occurrence of an extremely slow debt reduction,
the economy enters a long and detrimental liquidity trap that depresses the
aggregate consumption equivalent. Moreover, under this circumstance re-
sources are reallocated from the employed to the entrepreneurs. The former
are agents close to the borrowing constraint while the latter are not. Thus,
the zero lower bound redistributes resources from the financially-constrained
agents to the financially-unconstrained ones. This, making the borrowing
constraint more stringent, depresses aggregate welfare even more.
Note that there is a small range of values of ι under which the aggregate
consumption equivalent is higher under the zero lower bound than in the
benchmark exercise. This depends crucially on the redistributive effects of
the zero lower bound. Indeed, if the economy enters a liquidity trap from
the second quarter onward, income is reallocated from the entrepreneurs
to the employed, namely from the financially-unconstrained agents to the
financially-constrained ones. Then, receiving more resources, the agents who
were close to the borrowing constraint consume more. The additional con-
sumption and the possibility of relaxing the borrowing constraint increase
the aggregate consumption equivalent. This result is new in the literature.
The voting outcome is shown in the second panel of Figure 15. Unlike
in the benchmark exercise, there exists a small interval of values of ι under
which the majority of agents vote for the income taxation option rather than
for the public expenditure option. This is the same interval under which
the share of output accruing to labor income increases. Then, if ι belongs
to that interval, all the employed agents, who represent the majority of the
population, vote for the income taxation option. If the value of ι is very high,
namely if the public debt reduction is slow, the majority of agents will vote for
the public expenditure option. Indeed, under these values the economy enters
a prolonged and detrimental liquidity trap where resources are transferred
from the employed to the entrepreneurs. Consequently, the employed, who
represent the majority of the agents, vote for public expenditure.
Moreover, both welfare metrics show a point of discontinuity. This is the
value of ι that generates an inflation path under which h1 becomes nega-
tive. Then, under this value, income is reallocated from the employed to the
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Figure 15: Aggregate Preferences
The first panel shows the aggregate consumption equivalent, ξ, as a function of the public
debt deleveraging speed, ι, under the public expenditure benchmark experiment, income
taxation benchmark experiment and under the public expenditure and the income taxation
experiment in the presence of the zero lower bound. The second panel shows the percentage
of agents who vote in favor of the public expenditure option as a function of the public
debt deleveraging speed, in the benchmark (continuous dark blue line) and under the zero
lower bound (dashed light blue line).
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entrepreneurs, making the zero lower bound very costly for the economy.
To summarize, by introducing the zero lower bound, the consumption
equivalent under the public expenditure experiment will always be higher
than under the income taxation one, independently of the speed of public
debt reduction. As a consequence, an egalitarian social planner finds it always
optimal to reduce public debt using public expenditure instead of income
taxation. On the contrary, if the agents can vote, there is a small interval of
values of ι under which the income taxation option will be preferred to the
public expenditure one. Thus, it is still not clear whether one instrument
dominates the other.
Voting among Four Options
Let us now understand if the introduction of the zero lower bound affects
the results of the four-options vote. I will show that the previous results
about the first-best and second-best option remain unchanged.
The agents can vote, as before, among four options: a fast debt reduction
achieved by income taxation (ι = .3), a fast debt reduction achieved by public
expenditure (ι = .3), a slow debt reduction achieved by income taxation and a
slow debt reduction achieved by public expenditure. To check the robustness
of the results, I define the slow debt reduction using two values of ι, one in
the interval within which the majority of agents prefers income taxation to
public expenditure, ι = 3, and one outside this interval, ι = 5.22
Figure 16 shows the results. The unemployed and the employed, even
when ι = 3, continue to prefer a fast debt reduction to a slow one. Moreover,
their preferences regarding the fiscal instrument do not change with respect
to the benchmark experiment. The only difference is that, if ι is very large,
the unemployed agents close to the borrowing constraint prefer a slow debt
reduction achieved by public expenditure to one achieved by income taxa-
tion. Indeed, under the latter option, labor income drops dramatically, also
depressing unemployment benefits. Hence, the preferences of the employed
and unemployed do not change with respect to the benchmark exercise.
On the contrary, the entrepreneurs change their preferences according
to the value of ι: they prefer a slow debt reduction achieved by public ex-
penditure if ι = 3 and by income taxation if ι = 5. If ι = 3 and the
22I also check for values of ι under which the zero lower bound binds in the public
expenditure experiment. Since the results do not change at all, I do not report these
voting experiments.
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fiscal authority chooses to deleverage by increasing income taxation, profits
decrease. Therefore, the entrepreneurs prefer a slow debt reduction under
public expenditure, since it keeps the real interest rate relatively high during
the transition. If, instead, ι = 5 and the fiscal authority chooses to delever-
age by increasing income taxation, profits increase significantly as shown in
Figure 13. Consequently, all the entrepreneurs will vote for a slow-debt-
reduction income-taxation option.
Note that the new preferences of the entrepreneurs do not affect the first-
best and second-best vote outcome. Indeed, if the agents must decide among
these four options, they still prefer a fast debt reduction: 51% of agents want
it to be achieved by public expenditure, while 34% of agents want it to be
achieved by income taxation. Hence, under this experiment, the presence of
the zero lower bound does not affect the outcomes of this voting process.
Preferences Regarding Different Speeds of Deleveraging
From the previous paragraphs it is possible to conclude that the debt
reduction needs to be fast and achieved by public expenditure. Let us assume
that this is not be feasible and that the fiscal authority is constrained to use
income taxation.23 Once the fiscal instrument is fixed it is possible to build
the following voting experiment: the agents can vote for a fast or slow debt
reduction. Again, I define the slow debt reduction using two values of ι:
ι = 3 and ι = 5.
Under this voting experiment, the value of ι considerably changes the
outcomes of the voting process. Figure 17.a and Figure 17.b show the out-
comes of the voting process under ι = 3 and ι = 5, respectively. Figure 17.c
shows agents’ preferences under the two experiments, by employment status
and by position in the wealth distribution. If the liquidity trap is not too
severe, the majority of the agents would prefer a slow debt reduction to a fast
one. This result is not significantly different to that under the benchmark
experiment.
If, instead, the debt reduction is too slow, the economy enters a very
costly liquidity trap where the employed agents face a considerable reduction
in their labor income. Then, independently of their wealth, they vote for a
fast debt reduction. This changes the voting outcome, letting the fast debt
reduction option win.
23Once again, I do not repeat the same experiment for public expenditure, since the
results do not change with respect to the benchmark case.
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To summarize, the presence of the zero lower bound has important conse-
quences only if debt deleveraging is achieved by increasing income taxation.
Depending on the speed of debt reduction, the economy can enter a detrimen-
tal liquidity trap. This new scenario does not change the agents’ first-best
option, this being a fast debt reduction achieved by cutting public expendi-
ture. It changes, however, the preferred speed of deleveraging if the fiscal
authority is forced to use income taxation. Indeed, the majority of the agents
prefer a slow debt reduction only if the economy does not enter a deep and
prolonged liquidity trap under this option. If this occurs, they will prefer a
fast debt reduction. A policy implication is, thus, to not postpone the debt
reduction excessively as it can be extremely costly for the economy.
8 Conclusions
I have studied the optimal public debt deleveraging in a context of het-
erogenous agents and incomplete markets. I have analyzed the optimal fiscal
instrument to be used, as well as the optimal speed of debt reduction.
The central result of the paper is that it is always optimal to reduce debt
quickly by cutting public expenditure. Indeed, by using this instrument, the
fiscal authority is able to keep the real interest rate low during the public
debt deleveraging process. A low interest rate helps the fiscal authority
and borrowers, who are the closest to the borrowing constraint, when the
debt reduction takes place. On the other hand, if the fiscal authority is
constrained to increase income taxation, the public debt reduction needs to
be slow. Again, it is the dynamics of the real interest rate that play a central
role in delivering this result.
A second result is that, independently of the fiscal instrument used, the
economy may enter a liquidity trap during the deleveraging process. In my
model, the zero lower bound has a new effect, beyond the classic low-output
low-inflation one. It can reallocate resources from the employed to the en-
trepreneurs. Since the former are the closest to the borrowing constraint, this
corresponds to a redistribution of resources from the financially constrained
to the financially unconstrained in turn making the borrowing constraint
more stringent. Due to these effects, the presence of the zero lower bound
affects the preferences of some agents: An extremely slow debt reduction,
achieved by increasing income taxation, becomes the most costly combina-
tion.
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There are two main limitations of the model. First, agents can invest only
in one type of asset, risk-free bonds, while, in the real world, they have access
to a wide range of financial assets. The possibility of investing in different
types of assets may dampen the fluctuations in real interest rates. This
can, in turn, affect the dynamics implied by the different fiscal instruments,
modifying agents’ preferences. Notwithstanding the large variety of assets
traded in financial markets, it has been shown that agents at the bottom of
the wealth distribution tend to invest, when they do, mainly in safe assets.24
Wealthier agents diversify their portfolio more, but participation in the equity
market is still ”far from universal”.25 For example, only half of median-
wealth agents participate in public equity markets. Hence, the assumption
of a unique type of asset, despite being restrictive, does not appear to be
implausible.
Second, in my model only domestic agents can invests in domestic bonds.
This assumption is slightly unrealistic, especially when considering the United
States, where much of government debt is held by foreign agents.26 The pres-
ence of international investors can affect some of the results in my model.
During the deleveraging process, the net foreign asset position of the econ-
omy remains unchanged in a closed economy. This can reduce the welfare
cost of deleveraging. Moreover, real interest rate dynamics are driven by
fluctuations in aggregate domestic consumption. Assuming the presence of
internationally held debt can in primis decrease agents’ welfare during the
deleveraging and in secundis weaken the response of the real interest rate.
Introducing this feature in my model represents a promising avenue for future
research.
This paper highlights some important concerns that a fiscal authority
may face when compelled to reduce public debt. My model has strong policy
implications, especially for countries that are currently undertaking austerity
measures. Indeed, the model suggests that some policies adopted by Euro-
pean countries to manage the reduction of debt are suboptimal. Italy, for
example, has announced the implementation of future austerity measures
consisting in tax rate increases.27 Following the model, announcements of
24Survey of Consumer Finances (2001).
25Campbell (2006).
26Gourinchas, Rey, Govillot (2010).
27Budget laws presented in the summer of 2011 projected large increases in tax revenues
for the years 2012, 2013 and 2014, see Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Press
Release, ”Italy Delivers”, 16 September 2011.
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increases in the tax rate that take place far in the future can make the
deleveraging process very costly. My analysis thus also suggests that the liq-
uidity trap that European economies are currently experiencing can partly
be explained by the management of fiscal policy in some Euro Area countries.
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A Numerical Method
In order to solve the model I use the method described by Guerrieri and
Lorenzoni (2010).
First, in the steady state I find the optimal policy for consumption, c(s, b),
and labor supply, l(s, b), given the real interest rate, r, and the real wage,
w. I discretize the endogenous state variables, b, using a grid of 2500 points
and then I iterate the intertemporal Euler equation (4) and the intratem-
poral one (6) using the endogenous gridpoint method by Carroll(2006). I
defined g(s, b) as the inverse of bond accumulation policy.28 I compute the
invariant distribution, Ψ(s, b), updating the conditional distribution func-
tion, Ψk(s, b) =
∑
s˜ Ψk(s˜, g(s˜, b))P (s|s˜), where k refers to the iteration step,
P (s|s˜) is the transitional probability from state s˜ = st−1 to state s = st. The
bond accumulation formula is not invertible for b = ψ. Nevertheless, it is
possible to prove that the above formula holds, once g(s, ψ) is defined as the
largest b such that b′ = ψ. After finding the invariant distribution, I check
that the bonds and labor markets clear. If they do not, I updated the guess
of r and w and I iterate again till convergence.
For the transition, I guess a path of the real interest rate,{rt}T1t=1, and
real wages,{wt}T1t=1 where I set T1 = 200. I find, backwards, the optimal pol-
icy functions for consumption {ct(st, bt)}T1t=1 and labor supply, {lt(st, bt)}T1t=1.
Again, in order to find the optimal policy functions I use the intertemporal
Euler equation (4) and the intratemporal one (6). Then, exploiting the fact
that I know the initial steady-state distribution, I compute Ψt(st, bt) from
t = 1 to t = T1. Lastly, I check that the bonds and labor markets clear every
quarter t. If they do not, I update the path of the real interest rate and real
wage accordingly.
Under the Rotemberg costs assumption, I use the same algorithm de-
scribed above. The only difference is in that I also guess and update the
inflation path.
28This can be derived with the optimal policy functions.
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B Complementarity and Substitutability
In this section, I study whether the elasticity of substitution among private
consumption and public expenditure affects the results. I set χ = 0.9 and in
order to keep the previous calibration unchanged I set β = 0.979 .
B.1 Flexible Price
I assume that the nominal interest rate can go below zero. I study how
the aggregate variables’ impulse response functions change with respect to
the benchmark exercise. Then, I analyze whether the value of χ changes
aggregate preferences.
Aggregate Variables Impulse Response Functions
Figure 18 shows the impulse response functions under a debt reduction
achieved by public expenditure (first column) and income taxation (second
column). The values of ι are set equal to 0.2, 1 and 3, as in the benchmark
case, to make the two exercises comparable.
If the fiscal authority reduces public debt by increasing income taxation,
the value of χ is irrelevant to determining the impulse response functions of
the aggregate variables. Instead, if the public debt deleveraging occurs by
cutting public expenditure, the value of χ has a non-negligible effect on them.
The lower χ is , the lower will be the fluctuation in private consumption and
public expenditure and the higher those in output and the real interest rate
will be . Let us explain why. Once the fiscal authority cuts the public
expenditure, private consumption is subject to two forces: On the one hand
it will increase since the agents receive the back public principal, on the
other hand it will decline since public-provided services are complemented by
private consumption. Even if the first effect dominates the second, private
consumption increases much less than under the assumption of imperfect
substitutability. This will have a negative impact on output. Consequently,
the nominal interest rate declines much more per given deleveraging shock
as is in Figure 18. Due to the deeper fall in the nominal interest rate,
public expenditure declines less under imperfect complementarity than under
imperfect substitutability.
Despite the value of χ affecting the impulse response functions of the
aggregate variables under some cases, it is not clear whether this changes the
agents’ preferences. I now turn to analyzing whether it does and how.
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Figure 18: Impulse Response Functions under Different Deleveraging Speeds,
χ = 0.9
Impulse Response Functions for public expenditure, G, income taxation, τ , real interest
rate, r, output, Y , and private consumption, C, according to different values for ι. ι = 0.3
represents a fast debt reduction, ι = 1 represents a smooth debt reduction and ι = 3
represents a slow debt reduction. In the first column, the public debt reduction is financed
by cutting public expenditure. In the second column, the public debt reduction is financed
by increasing income taxation. All the variables, except for r and τ are in log-deviations
from the final steady state values. The values for r and τ are given in percentages.
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Aggregate Welfare
I study the aggregate preferences using two metrics: the aggregate con-
sumption equivalent, ξ, and the voting experiment, both described in subsec-
tion 6.2. Figure 19 shows the results. The first panel represents the aggre-
gate consumption equivalent, ξ, as a function of the public debt deleveraging
speed, ι, both under the public expenditure experiment and under the in-
come taxation one. In the second panel, I plot the percentage of agents who
vote in favor of the public expenditure option as a function of the public debt
deleveraging speed.
Under imperfect complementarity of public expenditure and private con-
sumption, it is always optimal to reduce public debt by cutting public expen-
diture rather than by increasing income taxation. This result arises for differ-
ent reasons that mainly depend on the behavior of the real interest rate when
the fiscal authority cuts the public expenditure. First, since the real inter-
est rate falls significantly, financially-constrained agents would be better-off.
Second, facing a low interest rate, the fiscal authority cuts public expenditure
much less than under the imperfect substitutability exercise. Therefore, less
wealthy agents, who mainly rely on this source of consumption, are better
off. Moreover, since there is a smaller fall in public expenditure, the econ-
omy faces less distortion. As a result, independently of the metric I use to
evaluate welfare, public expenditure is always better than income taxation.
B.2 Nominal Rigidities and the Zero Lower Bound
I do not describe the consequences of the zero lower bound when the fiscal
authority reduces public debt by increasing income taxation. Indeed, these
are exactly the same as under the imperfect substitutability experiment.
I focus my analysis on debt reduction via public expenditure. Since under
the flexible price experiment the real interest rate fluctuates considerably,
the non-negativity constraint binds more frequently. Moreover,under a slow
debt reduction, the economy may enter a liquidity trap. Let us understand
why. Figure 20 shows the impulse response functions for the flexible price
exercise and the zero lower bound when debt reduction occurs via public
expenditure. I use the same values of ι as in Figure 12 to make the two
exercises comparable. In the first column, I plot ι = 0.1 and in the second ι =
10. If the debt reduction is fast (first column), then the nominal interest rate
falls in the first quarter. When the non-negativity constraints binds, output
decreases significantly, as well as public expenditure. Since the firms cut their
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Figure 19: Aggregate Preferences, χ = .9
The first panel shows the aggregate consumption equivalent, ξ, as a function of the public
debt deleveraging speed, ι, both under the public expenditure experiment and under the
income taxation one. The second panel shows the percentage of agents who vote in favor
of the public expenditure option as a function of the public debt deleveraging speed.
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production, decreasing their labor demand, real wages fall considerably. As a
consequence, output is redistributed from the employed to the entrepreneurs,
deepening the output recession.29
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Figure 20: Impulse Response Functions and the Zero Lower Bound, χ = .9
Impulse Response Functions for public expenditure, G, output, Y , real wage, w, and the
nominal interest rate under the benchmark exercise (continuous blue line) and the zero
lower bound (red dashed line). I set ι = 0.1 in the first column and ι = 10 in the second
column. All the variables except for i are in log-deviations from the final steady state
values. The values for i are given in percentages.
On the other hand, under a slow debt reduction, the zero lower bound
binds in the last quarter. This is represented in the second column of Fig-
ure 20. Under imperfect complementarity, the presence of the zero lower
29As explained in section 7, under this circumstance, resources are reallocated from the
financially-constrained agents to the financially unconstrained ones.
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bound can lead to a deep output recession in the last quarter. Then, if this
happens, in the third quarter the agents are willing to save more, exerting
a downward pressure on the nominal interest rate even in this quarter. The
economy may enter a prolonged liquidity trap. Note, by the way, that the
liquidity trap is not so detrimental for the economy. Indeed, in the third
quarter, since the real rate is lower, public expenditure increases (the fiscal
authority is a borrower). Then, due to the imperfect complementarity, pri-
vate consumption also increases, leading to an output expansion. Since the
firms demand more labor, the real wage increases and profits decrease. Then,
resources are redistributed from the entrepreneurs to the employed agents.
The presence of the zero lower bound, under the imperfect complementar-
ity assumption, also influences the agents’ preferences for public expenditure
as shown in Figure 21. In the first panel, I plot the aggregate consumption
equivalent, ξ, defined in subsection 6.2, under the public expenditure bench-
mark experiment and under the income taxation benchmark experiment,
under the public expenditure and the income taxation experiments with the
presence of the zero lower bound. The second panel in Figure 21 shows the
percentage of agents who vote in favor of public expenditure against income
taxation for a given value of ι. The dark blue continuous line represents
the voting outcome under the benchmark, while the light blue dashed line
represents the voting outcome under the presence of the zero lower bound.
Differently to before, under a very fast debt reduction the agents prefer
the income taxation instrument, independently of the welfare criteria con-
sidered. This is due to the deep recession caused by the zero lower bound,
which redistributes resources from financially constrained agents to finan-
cially unconstrained ones. Note that under a slow debt reduction the econ-
omy prefers the public expenditure instrument to the income taxation one.
The policy implication is that if public and private consumption are imper-
fect complements, the fiscal authority must reduce the debt by cutting public
expenditure, unless the debt deleveraging is too fast.
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Figure 21: Aggregate Preferences and the Zero Lower Bound, χ = .9
The first panel shows the aggregate consumption equivalent, ξ, as a function of public
debt deleveraging speed, ι, both under public expenditure experiment, under the income
taxation-benchmark experiment, under the public expenditure and the income taxation
experiment with the presence of zero lower bound. The second panel shows the percentage
of agents who vote in favor of the public expenditure option as a function of public debt
deleveraging speed in the benchmark (continuous dark blue line) and under the zero lower
bound (dashed light blue line).
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